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Abstract 
In the three decades since the end of the Maoist era, all forms of religion in China 
have been undergoing restoration, innovation and expansion. Belying Marxist and 
secularist predictions of religion’s inevitable demise, most forms of religion, 
whether new or traditional, indigenous or foreign, official or illegal, ethnic or 
universal, communal or individual, and all combinations thereof, have enjoyed 
increasing popularity. This chapter begins with a discussion of what counts as 
“religion” in the Chinese context and how it can be measured, and presents a brief 
outline of the historical factors underlying the current situation. It then provides 
an overview of the PRC’s policy toward religion, which constitutes the framework 
within which (or, more often, outside of which) Chinese religious life is organized. 
It finally presents the basic evolution since 1979 of Chinese communal religion, 
the qigong movement, the Confucian revival, Buddhism and Daoism, Islam, and 
Christianity. 
Keywords : Buddhism; Catholicism; Confucianism; Daoism; Islam; Protestantism; 
qigong; religion. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 In the three decades since the end of the Maoist era, all forms of religion in 
China have been undergoing restoration, innovation and expansion. The phenomenon 
has had significant impacts on the People’s Republic’s international relations and internal 
politics; a growing influence on Chinese civil society, intellectual discourse and grassroots 
social organization; and, in various contexts, intriguing connections between economic 
life and religious beliefs and networks. The growth of religion in China has occurred in 
the wake of humanity’s most thorough and sustained experiment in creating a society 
without any religion at all, during the Cultural Revolution years (1966-1976) when all 
forms of religious activity and organization were banned for a decade. Belying Marxist 
and secularist predictions of religion’s inevitable demise, most forms of religion, whether 
new or traditional, indigenous or foreign, official or illegal, ethnic or universal, communal 
or individual, and all combinations thereof, have enjoyed increasing popularity. These 
changes have put pressure on the state’s regulatory framework for religion, which 
remains essentially unchanged since the 1950’s, while the future role of religion in 
Chinese society remains an open question. This chapter will begin with a discussion of 
what counts as “religion” in the Chinese context and how it can be measured, and 
present a brief outline of the historical factors underlying the current situation. It will 
then provide an overview of the PRC’s policy toward religion, which constitutes the 
framework within which (or, more often, outside of which) Chinese religious life is 
organized. It will finally present the basic evolution since 1979 of Chinese communal 
religion, the qigong movement, the Confucian revival, Buddhism and Daoism, Islam, and 
Christianity.  
 
Counting religious believers in China 
 
 According to official statistics, there are 100 million religious believers in 
mainland China, amounting to approx. 8 % of the population. Most scholars, however, 
consider this figure to be a serious underestimation. In 2009, some Chinese researchers, 
operating independently, released a survey which raised the figure to 300 million 
(Goossaert, 2011); while in 2010, a joint Chinese-American survey was announced which 
claimed that over 85% of the adult population have some sort of religious belief or 
practice (F. Yang et al 2010; F. Yang 2010).  
 The reason for these discrepancies – besides the fact that local religious affairs 
officials have a career incentive to under-report the extent of religious activity in their 
jurisdiction – can be attributed to the complex organizational structure and patterns of 
identification in Chinese religious culture. In primarily Christian and Muslim societies, 
most people explicitly identify with a single, exclusive religion, each of which has its own 
institutions which aim to structure all aspects of a member’s religious life, from life-cycle 
rituals (weddings, funerals) to theology, individual spirituality, moral teachings, 
congregational activity and social engagement. All of these aspects of spiritual and 
religious life are widespread in Chinese culture, but they are not organized into a single 
institution; they are not always clearly distinguished from secular life, and they are usually 
not the subject of a conscious identification by individuals. Thus, it is likely that, if asked 
what religion she believes in, a Chinese person is likely to respond “none”, even though 
she may well have a small shrine to Guanyin, the goddess of mercy, in her home, and 
goes to burn incense at a temple at special occasions. Furthermore, people may engage in 
acts of worship of gods without themselves being clear about how much they actually 
“believe” in what they are doing. As a result, surveys and statistics can be a misleading 
tool for taking the pulse of religious life, unless survey designers and users have a clear 
understanding of how religious practices and beliefs fit into Chinese culture and society. 
More recent studies have refined their methodology, by trying to measure not only 
religious affiliation, but also the extent to which people actually engage in religious 
practices such as burning incense at a temple, attending a church, wearing a charm, or 
following fengshui rules, or believe in notions such as heaven, hell, reincarnation or 
supernaturtal forces. A survey directed by Fenggang Yang and a Chinese research firm, 
using a sample of 7021 cases conducted in 2007, thus incorporated such types of 
elements into his questionnaire, yielding the following data, among others:  
- In the previous 12 months, up to 754 million had practiced some form of 
ancestor worship.  
- around 362 million had practiced some form of divination (including fortune-
telling, face-reading, etc).  
- around 141 million believed in the god of wealth (caishen), and a similar number 
practiced fengshui restrictions or had consulted a fengshui master.  
In terms of religious affiliations, the survey estimates that around 185 million self-identify 
as Buddhists (around 18% of the adult population); 33 million self-identify as Christian 
(3.2% of the adult population, including 30 million Protestants and 3 million Catholics); 
and 12 million self-identify as Daoists (1.2%). Only around 15% can be counted as true 
atheists, having neither supernatural beliefs nor participated in any religious practices (F. 
Yang et al, 2010; F. Yang, 2010).  
There are many reasons for the low levels of explicit religious affiliation of 
Chinese people, in spite of relatively high levels of religious beliefs and practice. One 
common explanation, held throughout most of the 20th century by Chinese intellectuals 
and most Western scholars, is that Chinese beliefs are an unorganized and incoherent 
motley of superstitions which hardly deserve to be called “religion.” Recent historical, 
anthropological and sociological scholarship, however, has questioned this view and 
established that it is itself a product of China’s modern intellectual and political history, 
in which the adoption of Western and Christian categories has led to Chinese religious 
culture being ignored, denigrated, or vigorously repressed by both the Republican (1912-
1949) and Communist (1949-present) political regimes (Goossaert & Palmer, 2011).  
 
Historical background 
 
In order to understand the complex diversity of religious affiliations and 
organizations in contemporary China, as well as the difficulties and contradictions of the 
Chinese state’s current policy toward religion, it is essential to review this historical 
process. In the late imperial era (the Ming and Qing dynasties, 1363-1911), China was a 
religious state, with the Emperor acting as the supreme religious authority in his capacity 
as “Son of Heaven,” who derived his legitimacy from the “Mandate of Heaven”. 
Government was conducted by ritual as much as by law and administrative procedure, 
and the Confucian ideology upheld by the bureaucratic class was not only a moral 
philosophy, but essentially a ritual system derived from classics such as the Liji (the Book 
of Rites), which prescribe how to conduct sacrifices to the spirits of Heaven, Earth, of the 
four cardinal directions, the main agricultural crops, and so on. Magistrates and 
administrators were the priests of this ritual system in the provincial capitals and county 
seats. The imperial cult overlaid millions of autonomous popular deity cults and temples, 
most of which were the main organizational form of social groups, ranging from 
territorial communities (villages, irrigation alliances, neighbourhoods and cities) to 
professional guilds (for carpenters, boatmen, merchants, etc.) and charities, and even 
sworn brotherhoods and underworld societies. Through the ancestor cult of families, 
lineages and clans – which was also the organizational foundation of the large 
landholding estates and corporations of South China – domestic units and kinship 
networks were also integrated into the empire’s Confucian orthodoxy. A religious 
dimension was integral to most forms of social organization, the culture was steeped in a 
common cosmology, and so, generally speaking, there was no distinct religious identity 
or affiliation. Buddhism and Daoism existed as organized “teachings,” but, with the 
exception of a small number of lay devotees who had “taken refuge” in Buddhism or 
become a disciple of a Daoist master,  these religions existed primarily as esoteric 
traditions, with specialized monks and priests offering ritual and spiritual services to the 
population at large and to temple communities, which hired them as needed, most often 
without claiming any formal affiliation to one or the other set of teachings. These 
functions could also be played by the priests and masters of myriads of local ritual 
traditions, as well as by lay devotional associations and salvationist movements, some of 
which preached millenialist and apocalyptic doctrines. These movements, often led by 
charismatic preachers and healers, did recruit large numbers of self-identified followers.  
The Ming state, fearful of sectarian rebellions, banned the latter groups as “heretical 
doctrines (xiejiao). It also restricted the number of Buddhist and Daoist monks, and 
attempted to co-opt popular divinity cults by canonizing them, with the Emperor giving 
gods official ranks and honouring them with promotions in the hierarchy of the 
pantheon. Through these measures, the state attempted to impose itself as the final and 
supreme authority in religious matters. Although it restricted or banned organized 
religious groups and unlicenced temples, the state did so in the name of orthodoxy as a 
religious institution itself, based on essentially the same cosmology as the religion of the 
people (C. K. Yang, 1960; Lagerwey, 2010; Goossaert, 2011).   
 The introduction of Christianity and Western influence challenged the traditional 
Chinese religious system. From the 16th to 18th centuries, Catholic Jesuit missionaries had 
adopted a strategy of integrating Christianity and Chinese civilization. This involved 
downplaying the religious elements of Chinese culture, depicting elite Confucianism as a 
rational moral philosophy compatible with Christian religion, and dismissing the rest as 
superstition. Later, in the 19th century, a more aggressive missionizing approach was 
more exclusive and denigrating of Chinese religion. By the early 20th century, with China 
humiliated by the Western powers and Japan, modernizing intellectuals sought to 
understand the keys to Western power, and concluded that it derived from its science 
and/or its religion – neither of which China possessed. Christianity became the model 
for a new concept of “religion” (zongjiao) – understood as a unified system of belief, 
theology and ethical principles, with a scriptural canon, an educated clergy, exclusive 
congregational membership and worship, and highly organized national institutions. This 
model became the norm for the religious policy and regulations of all Chinese states, 
from the Chinese revolution of 1912 until the present. When Chinese constitutions 
stipulated the freedom of religious belief, and regulations provided for the recognition 
and registration of religious organizations, they have (with a few short-lived exceptions) 
applied only to the “religions” fitting the Christian model, i.e. Christianity itself (usually 
understood in China as two separate religions, Catholicism and Protestantism), Islam, 
Buddhism and, more problematically, Daoism. All the rest – including most of the 
religious system outlined above – was delegitimized as superstition, and became the 
target of anti-superstition campaigns and movements to confiscate popular temples and 
convert them into schools, government offices, barracks, granaries and other uses, 
throughout the first half of the 20th century (Nedostup, 2009; Goossaert & Palmer, 
2011).  
 
PRC religious policy 
 
 After the PRC was established in 1949, the new regime based its religious policy 
on the same categories. Official, state-controlled religious associations were established 
for the Buddhists (1953), Protestants (1954), Muslims (1954), Catholics (1957) and 
Daoists (1957), which, combined, had only 11.4 million declared followers. Redemptive 
societies such as Yiguandao, which had more followers than any of the recognized 
religious institutions, were ruthlessly exterminated as “reactionary sects and secret 
societies.” And ancestor worship, communal religion, and temple cults, which were 
practiced by almost all Chinese people, were banned as “feudal superstition” (Laliberté, 
2011; F. Yang, 2006, p. 103; Palmer, 2008, 2011). 
 The religious policy of the PRC built on the ideology and experience of the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) as elaborated during the Chinese civil war and in 
“liberated areas” prior to 1949. Ideologically, the CCP followed the Marxist dictum that 
religion was the “opiate of the masses”, an instrument of domination by the ruling 
classes and an illusionary otherworldly hope for people who had no chance to improve 
their lives in this world. In theory, this meant that religion would naturally disappear once 
the class-based social structure was eliminated and the peoples’ hopes and desires 
attained through communism. There was thus no need to directly attack religion; it was 
its class foundations which had to be destroyed. In practice, however, the CCP 
developed a more pro-active and two-pronged approach to religion, in the context of its 
United Front policy of building friendly ties with potential non-communist allies, in a 
common struggle against the enemy. Those religious individuals and groups which were 
identified as actively collaborating with the CCP’s enemies (depending on the time and 
context, this meant Japanese invaders, the Kuomintang, the feudal landlords, capitalists, 
colonialists, or imperialists) were to be targeted and ruthlessly eliminated, while those 
who shared the CCP’s ideals and were willing to cooperate with the Party, were to be 
nurtured and strengthened with government assistance, so that they could use their social 
influence and religious legitimacy to support the regime.  
Geopolitical considerations were crucial in drawing the battle-lines of the United 
Front. Christianity was tainted by its close organizational association with foreign 
churches, Western imperialism and anti-communism; both Protestants and Catholics 
were torn by struggles between pro-CCP “patriotic” believers, who ran the official 
associations, and those who did not rally to the new regime, who were struggled against 
and driven underground, planting the seeds of the underground Catholic church, loyal to 
the Vatican, and the Protestant “house churches”. Buddhism and Islam, on the other 
hand, were the religions of the ethnic minorities of the vast Western borderlands 
including Tibet and Xinjiang, which needed to be placated to ensure their allegiance to 
the Peoples’ Republic; these religions were also used to build diplomatic bridges with 
Asian and Third World nations. Buddhism and Islam thus became important instruments 
in the PRC’s ethnic and foreign policies (Welch, 1972; Goossaert and Palmer, 2011).  
But by the end of the 1950’s, leftist radicalism undermined the alliances of the 
United Front; a short respite in the early 1960’s was followed by the total suppression of 
all forms of religion during the Cultural Revolution. Even the official religious 
associations were banned, as well as the State Council’s Bureau of Religious Affairs and 
the Party’s United Front Department itself. Tibetan Buddhists were the first to be 
alienated and the 14th Dalai Lama (Tenzin Gyatso, b. 1935), who had held positions as 
Deputy Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National Peoples’ Congress, took 
exile in India with his court in 1959; the more pro-Beijing 10th Panchen Lama (1938-
1989) was himself imprisoned from 1964 to 1977.  All temples, monasteries and 
churches were closed. Muslims suffered greatly, in some areas being forced to eat pork. 
Christians could only worship in secret. The shrines, statues, and manuscripts of 
communal cults were destroyed. Celibate monks were forced to marry, and many priests 
and pastors were sent to re-education camps. Little visible religion of any kind remained. 
Following Deng Xiaoping’s accession to power and the launch of the new policy 
of reform and opening up, the PRC government began a process of undoing the 
excesses of the cultural revolution. Religious leaders were rehabilitated and a small 
number of temples, monasteries, churches and mosques were re-opened. The Religious 
Affairs Bureau was re-established in 1979 and the United Front policy was renewed. The 
1982 constitution guaranteed the freedom of individual religious belief, although it 
placed restrictions on many aspects of religious organization and activity. 
The policy framework was outlined in more detail in “Document no. 19,” also 
issued in 1982. This document stressed the importance of individual religious freedom 
and the counterproductive results of forcing people away from religion, calling for a 
more gradual approach -- but it reiterated the ultimate goal of marginalising and 
ultimately eliminating religion, and called for a more vigorous promotion of atheist 
education and propaganda. At the same time, the document called for a better 
implementation of religious freedom through the re-establishment of the official 
religious associations, the opening of more designated places of worship, the training of 
clergy, and the development of international religious exchanges – all of which were 
limited to the clergy, places of worship, and activities of the five officially-recognized 
religious associations. Document 19 legitimised the restoration of legal religious life, 
while inscribing it into a clear regulatory framework compatible with Marxist eschatology 
(MacInnis, 1989).  
The 1980’s saw the beginnings of a religious revival, as worshippers reclaimed 
and rebuilt confiscated or destroyed temples, churches and mosques. In Tibet and in the 
Muslim areas of the West, religious fervour bloomed, pent up for well over a decade. By 
the early 1990’s, following the Tiananmen student movement of 1989, the CCP 
leadership became aware that religion continued to be an important social force. Prior to 
the Tiananmen events, riots had occurred in Tibet in February and March 1989, and 
Muslims, in the “Chinese Salman Rushdie Affair,” had also demonstrated in several 
provinces to protest the publication of derogatory stories about Islam in Chinese books. 
Outside China, the Polish Catholic Church had played a role in triggering the chain of 
events leading to the collapse of the Soviet Bloc, and Islam was a potential political 
factor in the several newly-independent central Asian states along China’s borders with 
Xinjiang. The CCP leadership became concerned with how to more effectively control 
religion, and, through a series of high-level meetings of the State Council and with 
religious leaders, elaborated the doctrine of the “mutual adaptation of religion and 
socialist society” (in which it was primarily the former that was expected to adapt to the 
latter). A new policy ordinance issued in Dec. 1990, “Document no. 6,” followed by 
other regulations in 1994, called for the closer monitoring of religious activity, places of 
worship and personnel.  
These policy orientations led to a gradual expansion and strengthening, through 
the 1990s, of the institutional structure of religious management in the PRC. The basic 
foundations of this structure had been laid in the 1950’s, but after its abolition in the mid 
1960s and its restoration in the 1980s, efforts now turned to its more systematic 
implementation at the provincial and local levels (Madsen & Tong, eds. 2000; Chan & 
Carlson, 2005). The system of religious management involves three major types of 
organization: the United Front Work Department, which is an arm of the CCP; the 
Bureau of Religious Affairs (renamed State Administration of Religious Affairs – SARA -
- in 1996), which is an agency of the government under the State Council at the national 
level; and the official Associations of the five recognized religions (Buddhism, Daoism, 
Islam, Protestantism and Catholicism), which are, in theory, democratic associations of 
believers. The United Front department is charged with developing close personal 
relations with the friendly leaders of non-communist organizations including minor 
political parties, commercial enterprises, overseas Chinese, ethnic minorities, and 
religious leaders. The United Front helps to arrange the appointment of respected 
religious leaders on political bodies such as the Peoples’ Political Consultative 
Conferences, turning religious vocations into political careers, symbolically drawing 
clerics into the political process. The SARA oversees the implementation of religious 
policy, including the registration of places of worship and clergy, mediating disputes 
between religious communities and other segments of society, and the negotiation of the 
return to religious communities of properties confiscated by other government 
departments during the Cultural Revolution (a process which is still ongoing, over 35 
years later). Different divisions within SARA are assigned to each of the five recognized 
religions. An additional division, established in 2004, is charged with research and policy 
recommendations, including issues in relation to religious communities “other” than the 
five officially registered ones, including Chinese popular religion, the Russian Orthodox 
Church, and “new religions,” notably the Bahá'í Faith and the Mormons.  By the mid 
2000s, these “other” forms of religion were increasingly viewed by SARA as a legitimate 
reality and tolerated in practice -- although the government, at the time of writing, is 
afraid of opening a pandora’s box by providing an avenue for formally registering any of 
them. In some provinces, the temples of popular religion can obtain legal status by 
registering as Daoist or, in rarer cases, as Buddhist.   
The official religious associations are responsible for each religion’s places of 
worship, and are the formal employer of the clergy. They also run seminaries and 
institutes for the training of clergy, which combine religious knowledge with secular and 
political education. Although their staff wear religious robes, these associations operate 
in a manner similar to other state-run socialist work units (danwei). Though autonomous 
in theory, the associations are embedded in a wider hierarchy in which they ultimately 
report to SARA. The latter, as well as United Front officials, play a role in the “election” 
of association leaders, trying to ensure that the individuals chosen to head the religion 
will enjoy both the respect and legitimacy of the religious believers, and the political 
approval of the government, so as to be able to effectively handle the relations between 
the state and the religious community (Palmer, 2009).  
This institutional structure exists at the national, provincial, and municipal or 
county levels. Other organs also play a role in the formulation and implementation of 
religious policy. Academic institutions, notably the China Academy of Social Sciences 
and its provincial counterparts, as well as certain universities, engage in academic 
research on religion. By treating religion as a form of “culture” worthy of serious inquiry, 
their research, conferences and publications help to legitimise religious life, while they 
also act as think-tanks, conducting surveys and offering policy recommendations to the 
authorities (Overmeyer, 2001; Dunch, 2008). The police (Public Security Bureau) and 
other specialised agencies, on the other hand, are entrusted with repressing illegal forms 
of religion, especially the groups designated as “evil cults” (xiejiao), notably Falun Gong 
and some Christian sects (Tong, 2009; Dunn, 2009).  
“Minority nationality customs” are an important legitimizing category for the 
religious practices of ethnic minorities. Indeed, while official and intellectual discourse 
does not consider religion to be a component of Han ethnic identity, religion (or “exotic 
customs” which are in fact religious) is considered to be an integral component of ethnic 
minority culture, and the defining aspect for some nationalities such as the Muslim Hui. 
Official policy toward ethnic minorities, which seeks to preserve the outward markers of 
ethnic diversity and identity (while promoting their substantive assimilation), thus tends 
to be far more open toward religion among the minority nationalities than for the Han 
(except when religion is suspected of fomenting separatism, as discussed below). In the 
10 minorities nationalities designated as Muslim, all members of the ethnic group are 
automatically considered to be Muslim believers; government policy in effect upholds 
traditional orthodoxy which does not allow one to renounce Islam or change religions.   
From the mid 1990s and until today, government discourse on religion has 
become increasingly positive. The crackdown on Falun Gong in 1999 (see below) caused 
a brief chill for many forms of religious activity, but it also generated an elaborate official 
discourse on socially-destructive “evil cults,” contrasted to the true “religions” which, it 
was stressed, make positive contributions to social stability and development (Palmer, 
2008). That a group such as Falun Gong could seemingly appear out of nowhere and 
quickly recruit millions of followers, led many officials to conclude that peoples’ spiritual 
needs were being neglected, and that more orthodox forms of religion should be given 
more space in order to avoid the spread of sectarian movements. Nowadays, the doctrine 
of religion as an “opiate” is rarely mentioned, and speeches by senior leaders have 
admitted that religion still has a long life ahead of it. The positive contributions of 
religion to society are recognized, and its potential contributions to economic 
development, culture, and charity and philanthropy, are now explicitly praised and 
encouraged. At the same time, the authorities still fear the influence and legitimacy such 
contributions could bring to religious organizations, and so there are still many obstacles 
for religious communities to engage in charitable projects (Laliberté, Palmer & Wu 2011). 
Overall, although the legitimate space for religion has steadily expanded over the past 
decades, the basic framework for China’s religious policy remains essentially unchanged 
since the 1950s.  
Most of religious life in China, however, from Chinese communal religion to new 
religious movements, as well as unregistered Protestant house churches, Catholic 
communities loyal to Rome, and other informal groups, either does not fit under the 
official category of “religion” or has not been integrated into the official associations and 
thus, paradoxically, escapes from state management under the religious policy. It exists in 
a vast and growing grey area, often tolerated but with ambiguous legal status. Many 
temples, rituals and practices have secured legitimation by presenting themselves as 
something other than religion – as forms of Chinese traditional medicine, sports and 
science (in the case of qigong in the 1980s and 1990s – see Palmer, 2007); as state-
supported “intangible cultural heritage” according to UNESCO norms (in the case of 
many deity cults, temples and ritual traditions); as tourist resources; as environmental or 
educational programmes; or as platforms for building economic and political ties with 
Chinese worshippers from Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macau, and Southeast Asia (Chau, 
2005b; F. Yang, 2006; M. Yang, 2004). 
 
Revivals of communal religion in rural China 
 
 Chinese “communal religion” refers to an integrated whole including a sacred 
local geography, temples and their organizing committees, cyclical festivals, ritual 
specialists, life-cycle rituals, and the ancestor cult. The sacred geography is expressed in 
popular lore about the fengshui energetic qualities of features of the landscape including 
mountains, rivers, stones, trees, tombs, and temples, and in relation to which villages and 
homes are positioned and oriented. Temples and shrines are the centres of communal 
worship of local gods and saints; they are the embodiments of local mythology and 
history, and are built and managed by lay committees of community members with moral 
authority (chosen in various ways including as representatives of each family or lineage in 
the village, selected by lot, etc.). Many temples host annual fairs which, especially in 
North China, are carnival-like events drawing crowds in the tens of thousands over 
several days, who come to worship, watch opera performances, shop at makeshift market 
stalls, and enjoy the noisy crowds. In the South, cyclical jiao rituals (held at intervals of  
five or so years) and other festivals are also common, and often feature processions in 
which deity statues are paraded through the community’s territory. While lay committees 
do most of the organizing, ritual specialists – who may be non-monastic Daoist or 
Buddhist priests (especially in the South), masters of salvationist traditions of the Unborn 
Mother cults, lay scripture-recitation groups, or others – are hired or invited to provide 
the liturgy, often with the assistance of amateur musicians. These ritual specialists also 
officiate at life-cycle rituals, notably births and funerals, and conduct healing rites. The 
cult of ancestors is conducted at an altar containing tablets for the deceased of recent 
generations, located in the central room of traditional peasant homes, and at their tombs, 
notably during the annual grave-sweeping festival (Qingming). While official policy, in 
order to eliminate the unproductive use of land by sprawling tombs, calls for the 
replacement of burials by cremation, cremation rates actually dropped in some areas in 
the post-Mao years, and remain low until today outside the cities (Goossaert and Palmer, 
2011, pp. 231-232). In South China, lineage halls are also common, federating through 
periodic rites the descendants of a common ancestor in the same village or region. In 
single-surname villages, the lineage hall is often the main community organization. In the 
past, lineages often owned large land estates and managed their resources, running 
schools and charities for their members. Today, lineages no longer directly own land, but 
they remain powerful sources of identity and play an important role in local politics.  
 The revival of Chinese communal religion has been uneven in different regions, 
depending on a range of factors. The level of tolerance and support of local authorities is 
an important concern, and can vary based on personal and kinship ties between cadres 
and temple activists, as well as the incentives provided by the use of popular religion to 
build ties with potential investors from overseas Chinese communities, or to secure 
government funding for heritage protection. Another factor is the appearance of capable 
activists with deep local ties and political skills, such as retired Party cadres, to take the 
lead and organize religious activities and rituals. And finally, the transmission of local 
religious memory is crucial. In some villages, priests and old people with good memories 
(even though liturgical manuals were destroyed during Maoist campaigns, they had them 
committed to memory and copied them down in the 1980s) have been able to 
reconstruct their traditions, which, sometimes, were only interrupted for a few years 
during the heat of the Cultural Revolution. But in other places, the interruption of 
transmission has been longer, and elder authorities are weak or forgetful, leading to the 
nearly complete disappearance of the local system of worship – or the younger 
generations are not interested in learning their skills (DuBois, 2005; Jones, 2011).   
 Earlier scholarly research seemed to indicate that the revival of communal 
religion was stronger in the coastal areas of South China, notably in Zhejiang, Fujian and 
parts of Guangdong (Dean, 1992; Tam, 2011; M. Yang, 2000). This could be explained 
by the government’s more open policy in these provinces in the early period of post-
Maoist reforms, greater material affluence (Chinese temples and rituals are expensive to 
build and stage), and ties with overseas Chinese eager to go on pilgrimage to return to 
the source of their ancestral cults (such as Mazu for many Taiwanese, and the Patriarch 
of the Clear Stream for Singaporeans: see M. Yang, 2004; Kuah, 2000). But more recent 
research has shown that, although it was perhaps slower to take off, popular religion is 
also undergoing a significant revival in the poorer, landlocked provinces of North China 
(Chau, 2005b; DuBois, 2005; Jones, 2010; Johnson, 2010).  
 The weak penetration of the state, and the low level of legitimacy of local cadres, 
has enabled popular temples in some rural areas to act as the main form of public 
organization and as a “second level of government,” collecting funds from residents and 
building schools, roads, bridges and other facilities (Dean, 2001). Some studies suggest 
that strong temple associations (or lineage halls in single-surname villages) contribute to a 
higher level of responsibility and accountability of local officials by creating social 
solidarity and enforcing common moral norms (Tsai, 2007). In recent years, county and 
local governments have become more tolerant of popular religion, and in increasing 
numbers have become its active promoters, under policies promoting heritage, tourism 
and local identity. At the same time, however, structural changes may have a profound 
impact on the forms of popular religion. Massive temporary migration of labourers to 
the cities has left many villages inhabited mostly by their children and elderly parents. In 
such places, rituals and festivals are poorly attended, except for the Chinese New Year, 
when most migrant workers return home. In the cities, the migrant labourers are 
disconnected from their local traditions; if they participate in religion, it is more likely to 
be Christianity, which they may then bring back to their native villages. Furthermore, the 
government’s drive to create a “new socialist countryside” starting in 2006, which has 
been expanding the reach of the state into rural areas and, in many places, involved 
destroying old villages to rebuild them in modern buildings near major transportation 
arteries, will undoubtedly have a deep impact on traditional religious culture, which is so 
closely tied to local memories of place and longstanding community relationships.  
 
Post-Mao urban religious culture and the qigong movement 
 
 While religious policy has attempted to identify, categorize and administer fixed 
and monolithic religious institutions, the social reality of religion has been one of rapid 
change, innovation and diversification. Much of the discussion of the “revival” of 
religion in post-Mao China has understood this revival in terms of a return to tradition, 
after decades of revolutionary campaigns which had cut the Chinese people off from 
their cultural and spiritual roots. However, owing to the profound ruptures in the 
transmission of tradition over the 20th century, coupled with the historical weakness of 
Chinese religious institutions and the contemporary reality of massive urbanization and 
commodification of culture, the reality is that most "returns" to tradition are, to a greater 
or lesser degree, innovations and reinventions which recombine elements of traditional 
culture to construct a spirituality or religiosity adapted to modern life.  
 This has been notably the case in urban China. The rural-urban divide is 
profound, but a product of the 20th century. In traditional China, local diversity 
flourished among the cities, towns and villages, but they all shared a common framework 
of culture, cosmology, and religious practices. In the modernizing projects of the 
Republican era (1912-1949), large cities became showcases of social experimentation, 
urban planning, rationalization, and hygiene, consciously in contrast to the “backward”, 
“superstitious” countryside. The socialist regime further entrenched this distinction by 
concentrating resources and investments into urban development, and through the hukou 
household registration system which created distinct categories of citizenship for rural 
and urban dwellers. This division is reflected in China’s religious landscape, in which the 
rural areas are the repositories of tradition, both looked down on by modern urbanites, 
and the subject of their nostalgic yearnings.  
The objective conditions for traditional communal religion, based on ascriptive 
ties to kinship and territorial groups, hardly exist in urban China, where, for almost 50 
years until the late 1990s, the primary social unit was nuclear families living and working 
in the compounds of state-run work units. Ancestor worship, lineages, and 
neighbourhood temples and shrines all but disappeared, and only in rare exceptions did 
they resurface in the post-Mao era: many traditional neighbourhood communities had 
been dispersed by urban planning and assignment to residence in work units. For several 
decades, most urban Chinese had little or no direct contact with traditional forms of 
worship; religious practice could be said to have almost completely disappeared.  
And yet, religious culture suddenly resurfaced in the post-Mao urban China, most 
visibly expressed through what came to be called “qigong fever”, the most widespread 
form of urban religiosity in the 1980s and 90s, in which one or two hundred million 
persons participated in some way or another. This was a craze for traditional breathing, 
meditation, gymnastics, and healing methods, often steeped in Buddhist or Daoist 
symbolism, which drew millions of adepts, and turned into mass movements led by 
charismatic masters. The phenomenon was spurred by the confluence of many trends, 
including the official promotion of qigong as a simple form of physical exercise derived 
from Chinese medicine and which could be praticed by the masses; a fascination among 
some leading scientists, military leaders, and media for paranormal phenomena under the 
guise of scientific research; and the booming popularity of Hong Kong and mainland 
kung fu films, TV series, and novels steeped in religious lore, ranging from Shaolin Temple 
to Journey to the West, which popularized Chinese cosmology and featured the magical 
feats of martial artists based on the same techniques of mind and body control as those 
of qigong.   
Qigong had emerged as a new category in the early 1950’s, when the PRC’s new 
health authorities, in the process of creating new, modern institutions of traditional 
Chinese medicine, engaged in a programme of revamping traditional healing practices, 
expurgating any “superstitious” content and reinterpreting the cosmology in materialist 
terms. Qigong was designated as one of the disciplines of Chinese medicine, alongside the 
materia medica, acupuncture, and massage, and state-run qigong clinics and sanatoria 
established in several cities. The goal had been to secularize the rich traditions of breath, 
mind, and body training which had been taught for centuries but often in a religious 
context. That religious imprint could not be completely washed away, however, and 
qigong was banned as “feudal superstition” during the Cultural Revolution.  
Qigong resurfaced in the 1970s, and was officially rehabilitated in 1979. Hundreds 
of masters quickly emerged, each teaching his own set of qigong exercises to groups of 
practitioners who gathered in parks and other public spaces. These groups expanded and 
formed national networks of practitioners of the same method. Qigong became an 
important component in the culture of early-morning mass exercises in urban spaces.  
But in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the qigong category also came to have 
associations going far beyond its original modern meaning as a set of health exercises. 
Some scientists conducted laboratory experiments on qigong masters who were said to be 
able to mentally emit qi (vital energy) to heal patients without bodily contact, and claimed 
to have discovered the material basis of this “external qi”. At the same time, the print 
media were caught up in a craze of reports about children with paranormal powers such 
as reading with their ears or moving objects from a distance. When qigong masters were 
discovered who purportedly had the same powers, the claim was made that qigong was a 
body of knowledge which could systematically train and develop the “extraordinary 
powers” latent in every human being, opening the tantalizing prospect of a new scientific 
revolution. China’s most politically influential scientist, Qian Xuesen (1911-2009), the 
architect of China’s nuclear bomb and the Chairman of the National Association for 
Science and Technology, became an enthusiastic promoter of what he called “somatic 
science” (renti kexue) which would combine Chinese medicine, qigong, and paranormal 
studies. This enthusiasm spread to the National Defense research institutions, which saw 
much potential in the military applications of paranormal abilities, opened special 
research units, and kept qigong masters on its payroll for conducting experiments and to 
offer healing treatments to the aging leaders of the CCP’s Long March generation.  
Among the practitioners in the parks, some qigong methods induced trance states, 
glossolalia, and visions of popular gods, while many masters became charismatic cult 
figures. Yan Xin, the most popular master, filled entire sports stadiums for his mass 
healing lectures, during which he emitted qi, the sick claimed they were healed, and 
paraplegics stood up from their wheelchairs. Qigong became a booming subculture with 
its own official associations sponsored by the health, sports, and science authorities, 
several mass-circulation popular qigong magazines, a growing market for books and 
manuals on qigong masters and techniques, and thousands of masters, many of whom 
began to build highly integrated organizations of trainers and practitioners. One of the 
largest of these, Zhong Gong, led by master Zhang Hongbao, which claimed 30 million 
practitioners, built a sprawling commercial corporation based on the sale of a progressive 
series of training workshops, and which also included health products, universities, and 
real estate investment (Palmer, 2007). 
Falun Gong, which was launched in 1992 by Li Hongzhi, began as one of 
thousands of qigong methods, but it quickly grew in popularity. In contrast to most other 
qigong forms, the focus of Falun Gong went beyond exercises and healing to emphasize 
moral cultivation. Li Hongzhi described a supernatural cosmology replete with demons, 
Buddhas, spirits and aliens, and an apocalyptic worldview in which salvation could only 
be attained through exclusive commitment to himself and his method, and abandonment 
of all worldly attachments, including to emotional feelings and affections for other 
people, to other forms of healing or medicine, and to other religious practices or 
teachings.  
Li Hongzhi moved to the United States around 1995, but Falun Gong continued 
to grow in China, attracting millions of practitioners in all the cities, and it was criticized 
in the press. Mass actions in response to criticisms, such as letter-writing campaigns and 
sit-ins, became a core dimension of spiritual cultivation. On 25 April, over 10,000 
practitioners quietly surrounded Zhongnangai, the central Beijing compound of the CCP 
leadership, for the whole day.  
The demonstration, the largest of its kind since the Tiananmen student 
movement a decade earlier, shocked the CCP leaders, who saw it as an existential threat. 
President Jiang Zemin resolved to exterminate the movement, now designated an “evil 
cult”, through a ruthless repression campaign launched in July 1999. The suppression led 
to the end of the qigong movement as a mass phenomenon. Yoga grew in popularity and 
replaced qigong as a popular form of meditation and health practice. By 2000, Falun Gong 
had disappeared as a public movement in mainland China, but an underground network 
of diehard followers continued to subsist. Now based overseas, Falun Gong became a 
global cyber-network linking followers around the world through a cluster of websites, a 
digital TV station, and a newspaper, the Epoch Times, published simultaneously in several 
languages. This network was mobilised to publicise China’s human rights abuses of Falun 
Gong practitioners in China, and, starting in 2004, to spearhead a campaign to discredit 
and topple the CCP as an “evil Party” (Palmer, 2007; Ownby, 2008; Penny, 
forthcoming).  
 
The Confucian revival 
 
In the aftermath of the qigong movement’s collapse, the first decade of the 21st 
century saw a new wave of cultural revivalism, this time around Confucianism. Similar to 
qigong, Confucianism does not fall under the official category of religion in the PRC; but 
instead of restricting its development, this indeterminate status has allowed it to expand 
under a great variety of forms and guises. The collapse of the imperial state in 1911 had 
implied the dissolution of the ritual order, the examination system based on the 
Confucian classics, and the traditional bureaucracy which had formed the institutional 
structure of “Confucianism.” In Republican China, the Confucian heritage had been 
carried and recast into in a wide range of forms: popular syncretistic salvational 
movements and redemptive societies such as the Universal Morality Society (Wanguo 
daodehui), the Fellowship United in Goodness (Tongshanshe) and the Way of Pervasive 
Unity (Yiguandao); an independent “religion”, the Kongjiao, imitating the organizational 
forms and in competition with Christian churches (and aspiring to be declared China’s 
state religion); an ethical tradition compatible with Christian faith and the ideological 
foundation of the New Life Movement; and a secular system of thought according to the 
norms of Western philosophy. With the establishment of the PRC in 1949, 
Confucianism became the very emblem of the old feudal order: the redemptive societies, 
which had more members than the five officially recognized religions among the Han 
Chinese, were ruthlessly suppressed as “reactionary sects and secret societies” (fandong 
huidaomen), while Confucian philosophy became a taboo topic even among academics 
(Goossaert & Palmer, 2011).   
In the 1980s and into the 90s, Confucianism began to reappear as a topic of 
discussion and debate, but mostly confined to academics, as part of a broader trend in 
the post-revolutionary period to explore and rediscover China’s traditional culture and 
thought, to debate its relevance to the contemporary period, and to re-examine whether 
it was the source of, or a solution to, China’s ills and even its political dysfunctions. 
Numerous conferences were held, and restoration works and ceremonies were 
undertaken at the ancestral temple of Confucius at Qufu (Shandong), with tourism 
promotion as one of the main motivations. This occurred in the broader context of the 
economic rise of the four “Asian Dragons” (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and 
Singapore), which stimulated much discussion on whether their economic growth was 
related to their “Confucian” culture of academic success, hard work and strong family 
ties – a notion promoted by Singapore president Lee Kuan-yew through his theory of 
“Asian values”. Meanwhile, overseas academics, such as Tu Wei-ming of Harvard, were 
working on contemporary reformulations of Confucian ethics and spirituality, and re-
introducing them into curricula and academic discourses in Singapore and China. During 
this period, then, although interest in Confucius was increasing on the mainland, a sharp 
contrast remained between the mainland, which was seen as “cut off” from its Confucian 
traditions and largely ignorant of is heritage, while an organic connection with the past 
supposedly existed in Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and overseas Chinese. Various 
groups and individuals from these areas were actively promoting the dissemimation of 
Confucian ideas in the mainland, and Confucius became a useful symbol for the PRC 
government in building patriotic ties with Chinese from Taiwan and overseas (Billioud & 
Thoraval, 2007; Billioud & Thoraval, 2008; Makeham, 2008). 
In the 2000s, however, Confucianism became much more of a mass 
phenomenon in mainland China, as well as the subject of a more focused involvement 
and instrumentalisation on the part of the state. A multitude of popular initiatives took 
inspiration from the Confucian heritage. Most widespread was the classics recitation 
movement (dujing yundong), which encouraged children and adults to nurture the habit of 
reading, memorizing and reciting the classics. This could take the form of small groups 
of children being taught by an amateur retired teacher, programmes introduced into the 
formal curriculum of schools, or early-morning gatherings of students and retirees in 
campuses, parks and public spaces to read and comment the texts. Many enthusiasts 
established “academies” as places for the collective study and intellectual discussion on 
the Confucian teachings, as venues for providing more formal classes, or as centres for 
recruiting and deploying volunteers to teach the classics or do other acts of social service.  
Most of these academies were fragile-non-profit affairs, but some were businesses, 
offering workshops for a growing market of business entrepreneurs in search of moral 
purpose and cultural capital. Similar continuing-education programmes in “national 
studies” were also launched by a growing number of universities, catering to the same 
market.  
Most of these initiatives do not consider themselves “religious,” and contain little 
or no element of worship. But some groups learn and strive to practice ritual, and the 
cult of Confucius is popular in these circles. Some explicitly called for Confucianism to 
be declared as China’s national religion, a position shared by some high-profile 
academics. Others are Buddhist groups which promote Confucian virtues and textual 
study as part of a wider range of religious activities (Billioud & Thoraval, 2009; Ownby, 
2009; Dutournier & Ji, 2009). 
Meanwhile, while the state’s stance toward Confucianism remains ambivalent, it 
has allowed for a much wider discursive space for its officially-sanctioned promotion. 
Though Hu Jintao’s principle of “harmonious society” does not itself make explicit 
reference to Confucius, it seems to signal a shift in the official ideology which can be 
involked to legitimate all manner of initiatives inspired by Chinese traditional thought. 
And the establishment of a worldwide network of “Confucius Institutes” as an emblem 
for the international projection of Chinese “soft power,” while still devoid of much 
content, symbolically elevates the Sage into a global symbol of socialist China.   
 
Daoist and Buddhist temples, clergy and lay networks 
 
In the 1950s, only a few dozen large Buddhist and Daoist temples had been 
preserved in the cities, as well as the main mountain monastic centres, and it is these 
officially-designated temples and monasteries which were re-opened after the Cultural 
Revolution – a few temples in each of China’s large cities, and the sacred mountains and 
monastic complexes of Emei, Huashan, Putuoshan, etc. This represented only a tiny 
fraction of China’s historically Daoist and Buddhist temples. Thousands had been 
destroyed, both during the Republican and Maoist revolutions; many others were still 
standing, but were occupied by the Cultural Relics authorities or by other units, none of 
which were willing to turn this valuable real estate over to religious communities. The 
Daoist and Buddhist associations in several cities tried to claim former temples, but the 
negotiations, usually conducted by the Religious Affairs Bureau, were difficult. Only if a 
strong case could be made to identify the temple as Daoist or Buddhist could the process 
begin, which was not always easy owing to the traditionally communal management of 
most temples. Even then, protracted negotiations and government support were 
required, which was unlikely; but it did occur, such as for the City God temples of 
Shanghai and Xi’an, which were restored and reopened under the municipal Daoist 
associations (Goossaert & Fang, 2009).  
 Since the 1950s, the large urban temples had been cut off from their traditional 
ties with networks of local temples and communities, and from their economic base of 
providing ritual services for the communities in which they were embedded.  Instead, 
they obtained a meager revenue from the government and from the sale of entrance 
tickets. But since the 1990s, as part of a general trend to push state-owned work units to 
become financially self-sufficient, urban temples have been required to find new sources 
of income. Tourism is one trend, with Buddhist and Daoist monasteries and sacred sites 
becoming tourist showcases charging high entrance fees. Another option has been for 
temples to offer healing, meditation, and health-cultivation programmes, summer camps 
and workshops, sometimes similar to qigong activities of a decade earlier. And many 
temples have become more active providers in the market for ritual services (including 
funerals and rites for healing and blessings), previously dominated by householder 
ritualists, as described below (D.-R. Yang, 2005). All of these trends imply a deeper 
participation in the market economy, which has led to much criticism of Buddhism and 
Daoism becoming excessively commercialized. Temples and monastic complexes require 
substantial funds to build and manage; but they can also become lucrative income 
streams. Many local governments have enthusiastically promoted the construction of 
grandiose temples and giant Buddha statues, in the hopes of stimulating tourist 
development, even in places where there are no historical sacred sites. The Shaolin 
temple has become an extreme example of a Buddhist monastery, of which almost 
nothing remained in the early 1980s, becoming a multinational kungfu-themed tourism, 
media and entertainment conglomerate (Ji, 2011). Some real estate developers have seen 
temples as an attractive addition to the standard investment portfolios of shopping malls 
and residential estates (Chan & Lang, 2011). In the summer of 2010, a Daoist priest in 
Chongqing, who had developed a successful model of turning his monastery into a 
retreat centre for healing and meditation workshops for well-heeled business elites and 
pop stars, was the subject of a media campaign to discredit him as a quack and swindler. 
The high profits from successful temples and religious tourist attractions lead to frequent 
conflicts between religious communities and tourism authorities and investors over the 
management and distribution of revenues. 
Most of the monasteries are staffed by resident monks from Buddhist and Daoist 
(Quanzhen) monastic orders, which, as self-contained religious institutions ostensibly 
devoted exclusively to spiritual cultivation, are the closest match to the state policy’s 
framing of religion. Monastic identity is defined by the norm of celibacy, “leaving the 
family” (chujia) to enter the religious community, although it is not observed very strictly 
in practice, especially among the Daoists. Monks still practice the tradition of moving 
from one monastery to another around China in search of masters, creating national 
networks of circulating clerics, which connect with local networks of temples and their 
branches and offshoots. And these networks are overlaid by the state’s hierarchies of 
local, provincial and national Buddhist and Daoist Associations and Religious Affairs 
bureaus (Herrou, 2011).  
In the Daoist case, however, the vast majority of priests are not monastics but 
the so-called “householder” Daoists who live at their own homes with their families, are 
not affiliated to a single temple, and operate as independent ritual specialists providing 
life-cycle and healing rituals to individuals and families, and communal rituals for local 
temples. In some areas, they practice the Zhengyi liturgical tradition, while in other 
regions local traditions such as Lüshan, Meishan, and vernacular Buddhist ritual forms 
predominate. Until recently these “superstition specialist households” could not operate 
legally (Chau, 2006), but local Religious Affairs authorities and Daoist associations have 
begun a process of registering and licensing some of them, particularly if they are 
affiliated to the more orthodox Zhengyi tradition (Lai, 2003).  
Many communal temples, which originally had only a tenuous connection with a 
recognized religion, are claiming a Daoist (or sometimes Buddhist) identity in order to 
secure their legality through affiliation to the local Daoist or Buddhist Association. 
“Daoistication” (daojiaohua) is an option considered by the religious affairs authorities, 
and experimented with in some regions, for registering and monitoring communal 
temples. But this normalization, whether it involves householder priests or communal 
temples, also involves engaging with a process of religious standardization emanating 
from the official institutions. This can involve posting Buddhist or Quanzhen Daoist 
monks at communal temples, attending political meetings, and undergoing formal 
academic-style training which substitutes secular discursive knowledge on religious 
history and philosphy for traditional master-disciple apprenticeship (D.-R. Yang, 2011). 
Meanwhile, Chinese Buddhism and Daoism are becoming integrated into 
transnational religious networks. In the Daoist case, temples in Hong Kong, Taiwan, 
Singapore and Malaysia have played a significant role in financing the reconstruction and 
expansion of temples on the mainland, and even in reintroducing or legitimating ritual 
traditions (Dean, 2011). And with the growing popularity of Daoist health and self-
cultivation traditions in Europe and North America, Western Daoist organizations and 
enterprises are bringing groups of practitioners on “energy tours” to China, where they 
visit sacred mountains and interact with Chinese monks. Some monks have even been 
invited to give lectures and workshops in Western retreat centres. Daoism is thus 
gradually becoming connected to global circuits, interlinking and transcending its 
traditional embeddedness in local society and national identity (Siegler, 2006; Siegler and 
Palmer, forthcoming.) 
In the case of Han Buddhism, transnational flows have contributed to the growth 
of lay Buddhist movements. The Republican era had seen the emergence of reformist 
tendencies, often called “engaged” or “humanistic” Buddhism (renjian fojiao) which 
afforded a greater role to the laity and advocated greater participation in contemporary 
social life and issues; but after 1949, though the modernizing rhetoric of reformist 
Buddhism was retained, there was little room for concrete innovations, and in the 1980s 
and into the 90s, there was little capacity within the mainland Buddhist institutions to 
engage with society or develop lay movements. During this period, however, since the 
late 1960s, Taiwan had become a world centre of reformist Buddhism and the base of 
several globalizing new Buddhist movements, such as Dharma Drum Mountain 
(Foguangshan) or the Compassionate Relief Foundation (Ciji gongdehui), which 
developed new forms of Buddhist lifestyle and identity (Madsen, 2007; Huang, 2008). 
These have had a direct and indirect impact on the mainland, contributing to a vibrant 
lay Buddhist culture. The first decade of the new century has seen the sprouting and 
flourishing of myriads of loosely-organized popular Buddhist networks, ranging from 
groups of devotees who print, compose, distribute and preach about morality books in 
temple courtyards, to gatherings of white collar professionals in vegetarian restaurants 
and business entrepreneurs who invite monks to give Dharma talks and initiations to 
themselves and their friends (Fisher, 2011; Fan & Whitehead, 2011).  
Often it is lamas of Tibetan Buddhism who are patronized by these 
entrepreneurs, a sign of the growing popularity of their tradition among the Han. While 
the mystery and spiritual traditions of Tibet have long been a source of fascination for 
the Han, as in the West, they have become more widely publicised and accessible with 
the development of tourism. Beyond the flood of documentaries, exhibitions, glossy 
magazine features, backpacker guides, package tours and adventure expeditions to 
Tibetan areas, which are gaining in popularity among culturally sophisticated Chinese 
urbanites, a growing trickle of Han spiritual seekers are sojourning in Tibetan 
monasteries and spiritual camps located in the remote highlands of Gansu, Sichuan and 
Tibet.  
Tibetan Buddhism has become a multifaceted, transnational and multi-ethnic 
religious movement in the post-Mao era. A conservative theocracy isolated and almost 
virtually cut off from the outside world in the first half of the 20th century, Tibet had 
been suddenly thrust into revolutionary politics with its full integration into the PRC 
state in the 1950s. The Dalai Lama’s flight to India in 1959 along with thousands of 
other monks, set the stage for an unprecendented globalization of Tibetan Buddhism, 
especially after many of these lamas ended up migrating to Western countries, and the 
Dalai Lama became an internationally revered spiritual leader and bestselling author. Like 
all religions in China, Tibetan Buddhism suffered from harsh persecution during the 
Cultural Revolution, but owing to the ethnic and political factor, the revolutionary 
campaigns have reinforced deep grievances and resentment between Tibetans and Han 
Chinese, and a deep religious faith has become a key vehicle for the expression of ethnic 
identity and aspirations vis-à-vis the Chinese state. Following the Cultural Revolution, 
both the PRC government and the Dalai Lama made attempts to initiate a reconciliation, 
but this failed in the 1980s. For some time the authorities tolerated Tibetans’ veneration 
of the Dalai Lama, but by the end of the 1990s, he was being demonized as a splittist, 
and later as a terrorist. Monks and common people have had to reconcile, but 
increasingly have to choose, between their religious loyalties and the requirements of 
survival and development within the socialist system. (Goldstein & Kapstein, 1998; 
Makley, 2007) 
 
 Islam 
 
Hui Muslims had been active within China’s nationalist movement during the 
Republican period, and the CCP had developed strong ties with Muslim communities in 
the northwest during the Yan’an period in the 1930s and 40s. Under the PRC after 1949, 
Islam, though recognized as a religion, has been largely subsumed as a “minority 
nationalities” issue: all members of 10 out of China’s 56 ethnic groups are considered to 
be  Muslim by birth – the Hui, Uyghur, Kazakh, Dongxiang, Kyrghyz, Salar, Tajik, 
Uzbeks, Baonan, and Tatar. Many special accommodations were made for their religious 
and ethnic customs, and two Muslim-majority autonomous regions – Xinjiang and 
Ningxia – were established (Gladney, 1996). 
After the Cultural Revolution, the 1980’s witnessed the re-establishment of official 
Islamic institutions and the revival and expansion of infrastructures. Mosques were 
restored and rebuilt, until, by some accounts, there were now more mosques than before 
1949. Pilgrimages to Mecca were resumed, with believers travelling to Saudi Arabia 
through both official and unofficial channels in rapidly increasing numbers. Publishing 
operations, both official and informal, were re-activated. Affirmative action programmes 
such as a more relaxed birth control policy and lower entrance standards for university, 
enjoyed by all minority nationalities, encouraged Han people to marry into or otherwise 
seek to join these nationalities, so that, between 1982 and 1990, the Hui population grew 
by 19% in eight years.  
As in the 1950’s, the official China Islamic Association is dominated by members of 
the Ikhwan movement, an anti-sufi reformist tradition which had been active as Chinese 
nationalists in the Republican period. Most of the mosques rebuilt with state funds after 
the Cultural Revolution are affiliated to the Ikhwan, while the sufi and traditional Islam 
(known as “old teachings”, or gedimu) continue to predominate in rural Hui villages. 
Having been so effectively co-opted by the state, however, the Ikhwan have lost some of 
their legitimacy in the eyes of many Muslims. Disaffection with the Ikhwan seems to 
have stimulated the growth of the Salafiyya movement, introduced to China in the 
1930’s, which advocates political quietism and an uncompromising adherence to 
scripture, rejecting the Ikhwan drift toward secularism, Marxism, and political co-
optation (Gladney, 1999).  
Just as, in the 1950’s, the CCP had adroitly played its Muslim card as part of its 
diplomatic strategy, the same approach was used in the post-Mao period, as trade and 
economic links have boomed between China and Muslim countries in Southeast Asia 
and the Middle East—the latter being crucial suppliers of oil and important clients for 
Chinese-sponsored infrastructure development projects. Many of these collaborations 
involve Hui as leaders, interpreters, or cultural consultants, while the increased links also 
facilitate religious exchanges: hundreds of Chinese Muslims have obtained scholarships 
to pursue Islamic studies in Muslim countries, while foreign Islamic foundations fund the 
construction of mosques and Islamic schools in China.  
The increased links with other Muslim countries, especially of the Middle East, have 
had a certain impact on the practice and values of the Hui. Arabia, as the root of Islam, is 
often seen as the standard for Islamic authenticity, and as the source of an alternative 
civilizing discourse to the Han-centred hegemony emanating from the Chinese state. 
Countering Han-centred stereotypes of Hui backwardness, many stress the higher 
principles of purity, truth, and hygiene contained in Islamic civilization, and identify with 
the prosperity and material advancement of the Arabian states—producing a trend of 
“Arabisation” among the Hui, including the adoption of Arabic architectural styles for 
mosques (replacing the Chinese temple style of older mosques with domes), enrolling in 
Arabic language lessons, watching Middle-Eastern videos, and adopting Arabic “Muslim” 
dress codes (such as blandly coloured womens’ headdresses and hijab) (Gillette, 2000).  
If geopolitical considerations have been a factor in an exceptionally lenient 
treatment of the religious practices of the Hui, it has been just the opposite for the 
Uighurs and other Muslim peoples of the far West. Here, in the face of violent acts of 
resistance by Uighurs, the Chinese state successfully lobbied both the neighbouring 
central Asian states, which were ethnically and historically close to the Uighurs, and the 
United States, otherwise keen to take up the cause of human rights in China, to obtain 
cover for a brutal suppression of any expression of perceived Uighur nationalism, in a 
campaign whose targets included any expressions of Islam outside of narrow, officially-
sanctioned confines.  
Sporadic anti-Han protests and incidents occurred throughout the 1980’s. Some 
Uighur resistance groups took inspiration from the Mujahideen victory against the 
Soviets in Afghanistan in 1989. It was the Baren rebellion, launched near Kashgar with 
calls to jihad in April 1990—in which dozens of rioters were killed by the army—which 
marked a turning point in the state’s approach to the Uighurs and Islam in Xinjiang. 
From then on, the CCP resolved to crush any signs of dissent and to strictly control 
religious life. This occurred only months after the Tiananmen student movement, and 
just as the Soviet bloc was collapsing, with several new Muslim-majority republics 
attaining independence on the Western borders of Xinjiang. China’s leaders feared the 
breaking away of Xinjiang, leading by domino effect to the disintegration of China and 
the end of the CCP regime. Tensions were aggravated by a series of bomb blasts in 
Urumqi and even in Beijing in the mid 1990’s, and again by riots in July 2009. The “strike 
hard” campaign launched to fight crime throughout China in 1996, was, in Xinjiang, 
primarily directed at any suspected “separatist” activity, including much of the religious 
life. Unregistered mosques were closed, loudspeakers for the call to prayer were removed 
from minarets, in some instances certain prayers were banned, children were punished at 
school for showing signs of Islamic practice, and teachers and employees at state-run 
units were deliberately offered meals during the fast of Ramadan. Religious regulations 
which were only loosely enforced among the Hui elsewhere in China, such as limiting to 
two the number of students under each imam, were strictly applied (Kung, 2006, p. 385).  
Due to the dearth of in-depth research, it is impossible to accurately gauge how 
deeply Islam is associated with Uighur nationalism, with some scholars stressing that the 
Islamic dimension is but a minor element. Clearly, however, Islam is being driven 
underground, and it seems likely that, in the absence of any other source of international 
support, and with possibilities for employment and material advancement increasingly 
blocked by Han immigrants, coupled with the stress on Uighur culture, Islam may 
become possibly the only remaining cultural and spiritual resource to which the Uighurs 
can turn (Castets, 2003; Fuller & Lipman, 2004).  
 
Christianity 
 
The Cultural Revolution had a defining impact on the evolution of Chinese 
Christianity. Owing to their direct association with foreign imperialists and a sometimes 
explicitly and actively anti-communist orientation, the persecution of Christians had been 
intense and systematic throughout the Mao years. And yet, the Christian community 
survived, and even expanded, through the worst years of oppression. Already, the failure 
of the state-controlled patriotic Catholic and Protestant associations to rally most of the 
faithful in the 1950’s, had driven many to meet in small groups in their homes—the 
beginning of the “house church” movement—and led to the emergence of underground 
Protestant and Catholic networks. The imprisonment, torture and execution of many 
priests, ministers and lay leaders only steeled the resolve of communities which 
developed narratives of martyrdom and of bearing the Cross for their faith. Christians 
gave a spiritual meaning to their sufferings, endowing them with a force with which they 
could bear the abuse and emerge with an even stronger faith. It was such people who, 
once released, returned to minister to their flocks in caves, in fields, in private homes at 
night, or even to missionize to other villages. Hundreds if not thousands of new house 
churches were thus founded in the 1970s. These underground churches were definitively 
cut off from Western influence, were strongly rooted in the local contexts of believers’ 
lives, and became far more “self-governing, self-financing and self-expanding” than the 
official “Three-self” churches could ever have hoped to become. These were 
communities in which the frequent absence of the clergy due to repeated arrests and 
imprisonment, led to the laity coming to play a strong role in the organization of 
liturgical and community life—a situation that continued into the 21st century, when all 
churches faced an acute shortage of clergy which could not keep up with the growing 
numbers of believers (Hunter & Chan, 1993; Madsen, 1998; Vala, 2009).  
By the late 1970’s and early 1980’s, the seeds which had been planted during the 
Cultural Revolution began to come to fruition, as both Catholic and Protestant religious 
activity came back into the open. On the one hand, religious activity was more tolerated, 
many churches and cathedrals were reopened or rebuilt, some church property was 
returned, and it was no longer necessary to meet secretly to worship. On the other hand, 
the Religious Affairs Bureau and the state-sponsored Patriotic Associations were re-
established; these once again attempted to establish their leadership over the believers, 
leading to renewed conflicts over legitimacy and authority, and to the division of 
Christian communities into the state-sponsored churches and unofficial, autonomous 
groups which did not come under state control.  
For the Catholics, the issue is the existence of two parallel hierarchies, one loyal to 
Rome and the Pope, the other to Beijing and the CCP. Unilateral consecrations of 
bishops by either side have led to periodic flashes of tension, although the reality on the 
ground is quite complex. While in some places, members of the official and unofficial 
Catholic churches boycott each other, leading some to speak of a “schism”, in other 
places official and unofficial clergy informally divide territories between themselves to 
avoid conflict, or even jointly minister to the same community. The issue of authority 
within the Church—the CCP willing to grant the Pope a spiritual authority, but no 
institutional power—is compounded by the question of diplomatic recognition, the 
Vatican remaining as one of the few states in the world to recognize the Republic of 
China on Taiwan rather than the PRC. Both governments are divided between hard-line 
and accommodationist factions, and overtures are consistently torpedoed by provocative 
actions, typically the unilateral appointment of bishops by either side. (Lozada, 2001; Liu 
& Leung, 2002; Leung, 1998).  
For Protestants, the issue is not one of two parallel hierarchies, but an asymmetrical 
relationship between a centralized, state-sponsored institution and a diffused galaxy of 
thousands of independent congregations ranging in size from prayer groups in homes to 
national networks of hundreds of thousands of believers, which had their own printing 
presses, retreats, and training systems. While the official churches control most buildings 
and assets in the large cities, this has not stopped the growth of house churches among 
urban residents, while in the rural areas and in the hinterland some unofficial groups 
have become so large that they often move out of the “houses” and build large church 
structures which can seat thousands.  
Indigenous networks such as the Fangcheng Fellowship, the China Gospel 
Fellowship, and the Born-Again Movement send evangelists to all parts of China, 
converting millions. These networks practice charismatic and Pentecostal forms of 
worship. Healing, speaking in tongues, and prophecy are integral to their practices of 
worship; morality and repentance are central to their spirituality. Many churches have 
become so coloured with local culture that they increasingly resemble the sectarian cults 
and salvationist movements of Chinese religion, with charismatic preachers leading their 
followers to turn to Christ for healing and exorcism (Hunter & Chan, 1992, p. 178; Yip, 
1999; Bays, 2003, pp. 496-97). 
While Catholicism continues to grow at the same rate as China’s population, 
Protestantism has witnessed a phenomenal expansion—from one million in 1949 to at 
least 30 million by the end of the century—a thirty-fold increase. While such a figure still 
represents only 2% of the population, the rate of growth is so rapid that, if sustained 
over several decades in the 21st century, many Christians hope to eventually convert a 
significant proportion of the population. Already, some entire ethnic localities in the 
Southwest have become Christian—with the support of local authorities delighted at 
their accomplishments in curbing drug trafficking and crime—and several house 
churches dream of, and have begun preparations for, the goal of sending thousands of 
Chinese missionaries to convert the Muslims of the Middle East, as the last stage in a 
movement “back to Jerusalem” in expectation of the Second Coming (Aikman, 2003, pp. 
193-205).  
Although observers in the 1990’s described the growth of Christianity as occurring 
primarily among elder, poorly-educated rural residents, it was clear by the late 1990’s, 
that Christianity also held a strong appeal among educated urbanites and affluent 
entrepreneurs. In the city of Wenzhou, one of China’s richest coastal cities with a large 
number of Christians (estimated at around 10 percent of the population), a new breed of 
“boss Christians” has appeared. These business owners, who are also zealous believers 
and leaders in congregations, preach a prosperity gospel and compete to build ever-larger 
and more dynamic churches. They consciously try to refashion Chinese Christianity into 
a more modern and sophisticated lifestyle that can satisfy the aspirations of people living 
in a market- oriented culture (Cao, 2011).  
The growth of Christianity in the cities is largely extra-institutional: while official 
churches are simply unable to respond to demand, McDonald’s restaurants have become 
as likely a place to conduct Bible study sessions as private apartments. For these urban 
believers, Christianity is part of the cosmopolitan, Western-inspired culture they aspire to 
– but also reaffirms moral values in continuity with traditional ethics (F. Yang, 2005).  
It is too early to assess to what extent Christianity may affect public life in China in 
the future. The theological orientation of most Chinese churches leads them away from 
this-worldly concerns. But there are many Christians among a movement of lawyers and 
activists who are willing to defend the rights of farmers, workers, and religious believers 
in the Chinese courts, at great risk to their careers and lives. For these activists, religious 
faith translates into an active engagement to protect individual rights within the 
framework of what the Chinese state claimed to be an emerging rule of law.  
 
Conclusion 
 
China in the early 21st century has become a laboratory for religious change and 
innovation. Unlike most countries, China has no dominant religious orthodoxy, and all 
forms of religion are expanding. State policy has kept religious institutions weak, but the 
hegemony of a secularist and anti-religious ideology, which was dominant over most of 
the 20th century, is on the wane as well. The spiritual and religious yearnings and 
aspirations of Chinese people are finding ever more diverse outlets for expression, even 
as official policy, more open to religion but still anchored to a framework inherited from 
the 1950s, is at pains to adapt to an ever-shifting reality. While the 1980s and 90s could 
be characterized as decades of restoration and revival following the traumas of the 
Maoist period, in the 21st century, the dynamic is moving toward innovation and 
diversification of religious practices and pathways.  
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